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Abstract In the minimum cost spanning tree model we consider decentralized pric-
ing rules, i.e., rules that cover at least the efﬁcient cost while the price charged to each
user only depends upon his own connection costs. We deﬁne a canonical pricing rule
and provide two axiomatic characterizations. First, the canonical pricing rule is the
smallest among those that improve upon the Stand Alone bound, and are either super-
additive or piece-wise linear in connection costs. Our second, direct characterization
relies on two simple properties highlighting the special role of the source cost.
Keywords Pricing rules · Minimum cost spanning trees · Canonical pricing rule ·
Stand-alone cost · Decentralization
JEL Classiﬁcation C71 · D60
1 Introduction
The notion of individual guarantees is as old as the discussion of Fair Division.
My actual share of the pie will depend upon other agents’ characteristics, but I am
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guaranteed a certain fraction of the pie no matter what these characteristics turn out to
be. The higher this “worst case” share, the less risky my participation in the division
rule. For instance Steinhaus (1948), and many authors after him (see e.g., Brams and
Taylor 1996), regards a division of the pie as “fair” if each participant receives a share
worth (to him) at least 1/nth of the entire pie. In the pie division problem, the 1/nth
guarantee can be implemented, and no higher share can.
This idea has been applied to virtually all formal models of Fair Division, includ-
ing public decisions with side payments (Dubins 1977; Thomson 1979; Moulin 1986),
the assignment of indivisible goods (Demko and Hill 1988; Bogomolnaia and Moulin
2001) and cooperative production (Moulin 1990); see Moulin (1992) for a systematic
discussion.
Here we look for the best individual guarantees in a classic network connection
model, the minimal cost spanning tree (thereafter mcst) problem where a group of
agents has to be connected directly or indirectly to a common supplier (source) in
the least costly way (Bird 1976; Claus and Kleitman 1973; Sharkey 1995). The cost
of the efﬁcient spanning tree must be shared among the agents, and hence individual
guarantees take the form of an upper bound on cost shares, and feasibility requires
that the sum of these upper bounds cover at least the actual cost.
In many cost sharing problems, a natural and much discussed upper bound is the
Stand Alone upper bound (e.g., Sharkey 1982; Moulin 1992), i.e., the cost of serving
a given agent in the absence of other users. Its key feature is decentralization. The
Stand Alone upper bound only depends upon the cost of serving the agent in ques-
tion, thus it can be interpreted as a (non linear) pricing rule, that an agent can use to
choose a level of demand. However, charging his Stand alone cost to every agent may
be grossly inefﬁcient. For instance in the mcst problem agent i’s Stand Alone cost
is that of connecting i directly to the source. These charges are clearly feasible, but
they ignore all potential savings from indirect connections. The challenge is to ﬁnd
a feasible decentralized pricing rule that improves upon (decreases significantly) the
Stand Alone charges.
In some problems, the Stand Alone pricing rule cannot be improved by any other
feasible decentralized pricing rule.1 We show here that in the mcst problem, a cer-
tain canonical pricing rule considerably improves upon the Stand Alone upper bound.
Decentralizationmeans here that the charge to any user only depends upon the connec-
tion costs of this particular agent to the source and to other agents; it can be computed
prior to any evaluation of connection costs between other agents and between other
agents and the source. The canonical charge is a simple linear combination of these
costs; it is closely related to an important exact cost-sharing method for the mcst
problem, introduced independently by several authors (Feltkamp et al. 1994; Norde
et al. 2001; Branzei et al. 2004; Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga 1997), and dubbed the
Folk solution in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2008). The canonical charge is always
1 An example is the cooperative production problem with a one-input one-output concave cost function
C such that C(0) = 0. Write xi for agent i’s demand, and let f (xi ) be a pricing rule improving upon the
Stand Alone upper bound: f (xi ) ≤ C(xi ) for all xi . Combined with feasibility, C(
∑
i xi ) ≤
∑
i f (xi ),
this implies easily f ≡ C .
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bounded below by that of the Folk solution, with equality whenever the cost matrix is
irreducible.2
We illustrate our pricing rule in two natural examples, one with a linear cost struc-
ture, and the other with random IID connecting costs. In both cases we ﬁnd that the
ratio of the total charge collected by the canonical rule to the efﬁcient (minimal) cost
grows as log n in the number n of users. This compares favorably to the Stand Alone
price, which in the same examples collects about n times the efﬁcient cost. Moreover
the total canonical charge is a vanishing fraction of the cost of a uniform spanning tree,
namely the expected cost of a spanning tree chosen uniformly among all (n + 1)n−1
spanning trees, independently of any cost consideration.
We further show that the canonical pricing rule has three desirable properties,3
pertaining to changes in connection costs and in the set of network users. The price
agent i pays is a continuous and weakly increasing function of agent i’s connecting
costs. If new users enter the network, this price decreases weakly.
Our “canonical” terminology is vindicated by three axiomatic characterizations of
this pricing rule. In Theorem 1 we borrow two functional properties of the mapping
from the matrix of connection costs (for all users) to the efﬁcient cost (that of an
optimal spanning tree): this mapping is superadditive and piece-wise linear. Super-
additivity w.r.t. connection costs conveys the designer’s preference for ﬂexibility: it
is (weakly) cheaper to build an optimal network for today’s cost matrix, and possibly
another network for tomorrow’s cost matrix, rather than a single network optimal for
the sum of today and tomorrow’s connecting costs. Piece-wise linearity says that when
the same network is optimal for two different cost matrices, then the optimal cost is
linear in the cost matrix.
Theorem 1 states that the canonical pricing rule is the smallest one that improves
upon the Stand Alone bound and is superadditive (or piece-wise linear) in the proﬁle
of connecting costs.
Theorem 2 offers an alternative characterization relying on two simple properties
highlighting the special role of the source cost vis-a-vis the inter-agent connecting
nodes.
2 The MCST model
We recall the well known minimal cost spanning tree model (see e.g. Sharkey 1995).
Let N ⊂ N = {1, 2, . . . , } be a ﬁnite set of agents where |N | = n. We consider
networks with a source denoted by agent 0. The source can be considered as a ﬁrm
supplying the agents in N . A network g over N 0 = N ∪ {0} is a set of unordered
pairs i j where i, j ∈ N 0. We denote by N 0(2) the set of such unordered pairs; its
cardinality is n(n+1)2 . Sometimes we speak of N
0(2) as the complete network on N 0.
We write G0 = {g|g ⊂ N 0(2)} for the set of all networks of N 0.
Two agents i and j are connected in g if there is a path i1i2, i2i3, . . . , ih−1ih such
that ik ik+1 ∈ g for 1 ≤ k ≤ h − 1 where i = i1 and j = ih . A network g is said to
2 This means that any reduction of any connection cost decreases the optimal cost strictly. See Sect. 3.
3 They are also satisﬁed by the Folk solution and the Stand Alone pricing rule.
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be connected if i and j are connected in g for all i, j ∈ N 0. A path is called a cycle
if it starts and ends with the same agent. A network is called a tree if it contains no
cycles. A spanning tree is a tree connecting all agents in N 0. There are (n + 1)n−1
such spanning trees.
For each pair i j ∈ N 0(2), there is a non-negative cost ki j attached to the link
between agents i and j . We think of such costs as the costs of establishing the link,
maintenance costs or indirect costs such as congestion, etc. The set of such costs is an
element K ∈ RN0(2). We abuse notation by speaking of the cost matrix K .
A minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) is a spanning tree T where the total link cost∑
i j∈T ki j is minimized over all spanning trees of N 0. We write this minimal cost as
v(N , K ). Note that this is also the smallest cost over all networks, not necessarily
trees, connecting the source to all agents. There is a unique mcst if all costs ki j are
different, but in general there may be more than one [up to (n + 1)n−1 if all costs ki j
are equal].
Two well known algorithms for ﬁnding a minimum cost spanning tree given K , are
due to Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957). We recall the latter, that will be useful below.
There are n steps: in step 1 we pick a cheapest link between the source and one agent;
in step t we add one of the cheapest links between the set Mt−1 of agents already
connected to the source, and N \Mt−1.
3 The canonical pricing rule: definition
As explained in the Sect. 1, we wish to cover at least the efﬁcient cost while charging
each user of the network in a way that only depends upon his or her “local” costs.
Given a mcst problem (N , K ) and an agent i , we write k[i] for the (n − 1) dimen-
sional vector (ki j , j ∈ N \ {i}) of this agent’s own connection costs to other agents.
Deﬁnition 1 Fix the set N 0 of agents and the source. A decentralized pricing rule is
a mapping f : R+ ×Rn−1+ → R+ such that for all x ≥ 0, the mapping y → f (x; y)
is symmetric in the n − 1 coordinates of y, and for all cost matrices K we have
∑
i∈N
f (k0i ; k[i]) ≥ v(N , K ). (1)
The simplest example of a decentralized pricing rule is the stand alone cost sa(k0i ;
k[i]) = k0i for which inequality (1) is obvious. The canonical pricing rule deﬁned
below is unanimously preferred to sa: it charges less than sa to every user, often sig-
nificantly so. Yet this rule too overcharges in most problems, as do all decentralized
pricing rules.
Call a pricing rule budget-balanced if it always satisﬁes (1) with equality.
Lemma 1 For n ≥ 2, no decentralized pricing rule is budget-balanced.
Proof Consider a problem (N , K )where k jl =0 for all j, l∈N 0. Then f (k0i , k[i])= 0
is the common charge of every agent. Sequentially changing the source cost from
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0 to 1 for all agents except for agent 1 and using budget-balance repeatedly, we see
that the price charged to each agent cannot change. Next consider K¯ where k¯0h = 1
for all h ∈ N and k¯ jl = 0 otherwise. We have f (k¯0i , k¯[i]) = 0 for all i 	= 1 and
by budget-balance f (k¯01, k¯[1]) = 1. As the choice of agent 1 was arbitrary in the
symmetric problem (N , K¯ ), we have a contradiction. 
unionsq
Note that Lemma 1 also follows from Lemma 4.1(a) in Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga
(2007), because our decentralized pricing rules meet the property Independence of
Other Costs in that paper.
We now deﬁne the decentralized pricing rule that is the object of this paper in two
equivalent ways. In Eq. 2, we denote by N the set of orderings of N . Given π ∈ N ,
P(i, π) denotes the union of the source and the set of agents prior to agent i in the
order π , i.e. P(i, π) = {0} ∪ { j ∈ N |π( j) < π(i)}.
In Eq. 3 we arrange the n − 1 numbers k[i] increasingly as kti , 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, so
that k1i ≤ · · · ≤ kn−1i .
Deﬁnition 2 Given N 0, the Canonical Pricing Rule is deﬁned as
can(k0i ; k[i]) = 1
n!
∑
π∈N
min
j∈P(i,π)
{ki j } (2)
It is equivalently computed as
can(k0i ; k[i]) = 1
n
k0i +
n−1∑
t=1
1
t (t + 1) min{k
t
i , k0i } (3)
We have
can(k0i ; k[i]) ≤ sa(k0i ; k[i]) (4)
For a given problem (N , K ), we compute i’s canonical charge via Eq. 3, a simple
linear combination after we have ordered the n numbers k0i , ki j increasingly. Equation
2 involves an exponential number of terms, so it is not practical for computations. On
the other hand it gives an intuitive interpretation of the canonical price, as the expected
marginal cost of adding a given agent to a (random, and typically inefﬁcient) spanning
tree.
Pick an unbiased random ordering π of the agents, and construct a spanning tree
Tπ as follows. Start by connecting the ﬁrst agent to the source and charging him the
corresponding cost; connect next the second agent to either the source or the ﬁrst
agent, whichever is cheaper, and charge him that new cost;..; charge to the t th agent
the cost of the cheapest link to one of its predecessors or the source; and so on. This
is similar to the Prim algorithm, with the crucial difference that in the latter, the t th
agent is not selected at random: instead it is the cheapest to connect with the t −1 ﬁrst
agents and the source. In particular for any π the cost of Tπ is no less than v(N , K ),
so inequality (1) holds.
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To see why Eqs. 2 and 3 are equivalent, ﬁx i = 1 for simplicity and observe that
if (k01; k[1]) remains in the cone in Rn+ such that the relative ordering of the n link
costs k01, k1i , 2 ≤ i ≤ n does not change, the right hand side of either equation is a
linear function of (k01; k[1]).4 A basis of such a cone is made of vectors (k01; k[1])
with all coordinates equal to 0 or 1, thus it is enough to check the equivalence for
such vectors. If k01 = 0, both equations give can(k01; k[1]) = 0; if k01 = 1 but
k[1] = 0, both equations give can(k01; k[1]) = 1n . Assume next k01 = 1, k1i = 0 for
2 ≤ i ≤ t, k1 j = 1 for t + 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then min j∈P(1,π){k1 j } = 1 if and only if
in the ordering π agent 1 precedes the t − 1 agents for which k1i = 0. This happens
with probability 1t , so (2) yields can(k01; k[1]) = 1n!n! 1t = 1t . Now (3) gives the same
conclusion since
can(k01; k[1]) = 1
n
+
n−1∑
h=t
1
h(h + 1) =
1
n
+
n−1∑
h=t
(
1
h
− 1
h + 1
)
= 1
t
.
We turn to the relationship between the canonical pricing rule and the (budget-
balanced) Folk solution of the mcst problem mentioned in the introduction. The latter
uses a reduction of the cost matrix introduced by Bird (1976) and Aarts and Driessen
(1993). Given (N , K ), the reduced cost matrix K ∗ is the minimal matrix K ′ ≤ K
such that v(N , K ) = v(N , K ′). Equivalently k∗i j is the largest number z such that
any path from i to j contains at least one edge with cost at least z. The matrix K is
called irreducible if K = K ∗. A matrix K is irreducible if and only if for all i, j, l we
have max{ki j , k jl} ≥ kil , which is easy to recognize numerically. Moreover for any
K , irreducible or not, the reduced matrix K ∗ is irreducible.
Proposition 1 in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2008) shows that for any irreducible
cost matrix K , the canonical charges (can(k0i ; k[i]), i ∈ N ) result in budget-balance.
Hence the following equation
ϕi (N , K ) = can(k∗0i ; k∗[i]) for all N , K and i
deﬁnes a budget-balanced solution ϕ, and this is the Folk solution. Because K ∗ ≤
K , and the mapping K → can(k0i ; k[i]) is monotonic, the Folk solution is always
bounded above by the canonical upper bound:
ϕi (N , K ) ≤ can(k0i ; k[i]) for all i , all K
with equality if thematrix K is irreducible. Note however that the equalityϕi (N , K ) =
can(k0i ; k[i]) for all i does not imply that K is irreducible.5
4 This is the piece-wise linearity property formally deﬁned in the second paragraph of Sect. 6
5 An example is N = {1, 2}, k12 = 2, k0i = 1, i = 1, 2. Here v(N , K ) = 2 = can1 + can2, yet k∗12 = 1.
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4 The canonical pricing rule: examples and efﬁciency properties
In our two examples we compare the total charge
∑
N can(k0i ; k[i]) to three other
costs: the optimal cost v(N , K ); the the cost of a uniform spanning tree U (N , K )
(deﬁned below), and the total Stand Alone charge∑N sa(k0i ; k[i]).
Example 1 Consider the linear tree 0 ↔ 1 ↔ 2 ↔ · · · ↔ n, with connecting costs
corresponding to distances, namely ki j = |i − j |. Assume n is even to ﬁx ideas, and
write Hn for the harmonic number Hn = ∑nj=1 1j . We compute ﬁrst the ordered costs
kti for an arbitrary agent i , distinguishing two cases. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 we have
k2t−1i = k2ti = t for 1 ≤ t ≤ i − 1; kt
′
i = t ′ − i + 1 for 2i − 1 ≤ t ′ ≤ n − 1
Then (3) gives
cani = i
n
+
i−1∑
t=1
{
1
(2t − 1)2t +
1
2t (2t + 1)
}
t +
n−1∑
t ′=2i−1
1
t ′(t ′ + 1) i
⇒ cani =
i∑
j=1
1
2 j − 1
For n2 ≤ i ≤ n we get
k2t−1i = k2ti = t for 1 ≤ t ≤ n − i ;
kt ′i = t ′ − n + i for 2(n − i) + 1 ≤ t ′ ≤ n − 1
⇒ cani = i
n
+
n−i∑
t=1
{
1
(2t−1)2t +
1
2t (2t+1)
}
t+
n−1∑
t ′=2(n−i)+1
1
t ′(t ′+1) (t
′−n+i)
⇒ cani =
n−i∑
j=1
1
2 j − 1 +
n∑
j=2(n−i)+1
1
j = Hn −
n−i∑
j=1
1
2 j
These two equations imply for 1 ≤ i ≤ n2
cani + cann−i = Hn +
i∑
j=1
1
(2 j − 1)2 j
from which we can evaluate the total charge
∑
cani when n grows. For two positive
sequences we use the notation αn  βn iff limn αnβn = 1. The above computations
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imply
n∑
i=1
cani  n2Hn 
1
2
n log n
Compare the total Stand Alone charge
n∑
i=1
sai = n(n + 1)2 ⇒
∑n
i=1 cani∑n
i=1 sai
 log n
n
Next we note v(N , K ) = n, so that the total canonical charge exceeds the efﬁcient
cost by the ratio 12 log n. On the other hand it is a vanishing fraction of the cost of a
uniform spanning tree, namely, the average cost U (N , K ) of all (n + 1)n−1 spanning
trees
U (N , K ) = 2
n + 1
∑
i j∈N0(2)
ki j
In our example, using the identity
∑n
1 i2 = n(n+1)(2n+1)6 , we compute
U (N , K ) = n(n + 2)
3
⇒
∑n
i=1 cani
U (N , K )
 3 log n
2n
Thus the canonical charges realize most of the surplus accruing from building an
optimal instead of a random uniform spanning tree.
Based on Example 1 and a couple of numerical computations, we conjecture that
for any cost matrix satisfying the triangular property ki j ≤ kil + kl j , the relative
excess charge never grows faster than 12 log n.
Example 2 Consider the random cost matrix K where all entries ki j are IID with
uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Using the algorithm leading to Eq.2 it is easy to com-
pute
E{cani } = 1
n
(
1
2
+ 1
3
+ · · · + 1
n + 1
)
 log n
n
; and E{sai } = 12
Up to a factor 2, the asymptotic behavior of E{cani }E{sai } is as in Example 1.
Moreover Theorem 6.21 in Bollobas (2001) shows that
E{v(N , K )} 
∞∑
j=1
1
j3  1.202
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so the ratio of the charge collected by the canonical rule to the efﬁcient one is, again,
of the order log n. Moreover the expected cost of a uniform spanning tree is n2 , so that
E{∑ cani }
E{U (N ,K )}  2 log nn .
Notice that the choice of the uniformdistribution in Example 2 is not important. Any
cumulative distribution F with derivative bounded away from zero (F ′(x) ≥ λ > 0
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1) gives the same asymptotic comparisons. Indeed F ′(0) > 0 implies
that the limit of E{v(N , K )} is ﬁnite (Bollobas 2001). Setting G = 1 − F , we have
G(x) ≤ 1 − λx for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Recall that the mean of q IID variables with cdf F is∫ 1
0 G
q(x)dx , so that the algorithm leading to Eq. 2 gives
E{cani } = 1
n
n∑
q=1
1∫
0
Gq(x)dx ≤ 1
n
n∑
q=1
1∫
0
(1 − λx)qdx = 1
λn
(Hn+1 − 1)
A similar lower bound obtains if the derivative of F is uniformly bounded above.
5 Three properties of the canonical charge
These properties play a leading role in the axiomatic discussion of the mcst and other
fair division problems (see e.g., Dutta and Kar 2004; Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga
2007; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2008). We deﬁne them directly for a decentralized
pricing rule, although it is clear that they apply to general solutions, budget-balanced
or not.
The ﬁrst two are compelling regularity properties:
• Continuity: f (N , k0i , k[i]) is continuous in (k0i , k[i]).
• Cost Monotonicity: f (N , k0i , k[i]) is weakly increasing in each cost ki j , k0i .
Violation of Continuity means that a tiny measurement error may have dramatic
consequences on individual charges. Violation of Cost Monotonicity opens the door
to artiﬁcial inﬂation of one’s costs.
Our third axiom compares a decentralized pricing rule across problems involv-
ing different sets of users. For any subset S of N we use the notation k[i, S] for the
|S|-dimensional vector (ki j , j ∈ S).
• Population Monotonicity: for any proﬁle of costs (k0i , k[i]), any S ⊂ N and
i ∈ S we have
f (N , k0i , k[i]) ≤ f (S, k0i , k[i, S]).
This says that the addition of a new user is never detrimental to any of the existing
users. It is a strengthening of the Stand Alone upper bound, provided we assume that
in a one agent problem, the pricing rule is simply f ({i}, k0i ) = k0i . Population Mono-
tonicity generates clean incentives in the game where agents must decide whether or
not to request connection to the source, based on their willingness to pay for such
service (see Moulin and Shenker 2001).
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Lemma 2 The canonical pricing rule (and the Stand Alone rule) are Continuous,
Cost Monotonic and Population Monotonic.
Proof All three properties are stable by ﬁxed non negative linear combinations and
the min operation. Thus it is enough to check that for all t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, the map-
ping (k0i , k[i]) → kti meets all three properties. Continuity and Cost Monotonicity
are clear. For Population Monotonicity we note that the t’th element in k[i, S] will be
greater than or equal to the t th element in k[i]. Hence, using (3) if removing one agent
at a time and noting that 1
n(n−1)k01 ≥ 1n(n−1) min{k01, kn1 } we get the desired result.
unionsq
6 Main characterization
We introduce two properties pertaining to addition and positive linear combinations
of cost proﬁles.
• Superadditivity: for any two (k10i , k1[i]) and (k20i , k2[i]), we have
f (N , k10i + k20i , k1[i] + k2[i]) ≥ f (N , k10i , k1[i]) + f (N , k20i , k2[i]).
The efﬁcient cost v(N , K ) is clearly superadditive in the matrix K of connecting
costs. Recall from Sect. 1 the interpretation of this property as a preference for ﬂex-
ibility. The axiom imposes the same property for the pricing rule: every participant
weakly beneﬁts from ﬂexibility.
For our next axiom, given a permutation σ of {1, . . . , p} we write Cσ = {x ∈
Rp+|xσ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ xσ(p)} for the cone in Rp+ such that the relative ordering of the
coordinates is constant and given by σ . We say that the real valued function g with
domain Rp+ is piece-wise linear if for any σ its restriction to Cσ is positively linear
(respects positive linear combinations). Key observation: the efﬁcient cost v(N , K ) is
piece-wise linear in R
n(n+1)
2+ .
• Piece-wise Linearity: the pricing rule (k0i , k[i]) → f (k0i , k[i]) is piece-wise
linear in Rn+.
Like Superadditivity above (or additivity in the axiomatic cost sharing literature),
this axiom wants the solution to share some structural property of the efﬁcient cost.
Its main justiﬁcation is informational parsimony: a piece-wise linear pricing rule is
entirely determined by its value over n coordinate vectors in one of the cones Cσ .
Theorem 1 The canonical pricing rule (and the Stand Alone rule), are superadditive
and piece-wise linear.
Conversely, if a decentralized pricing rule f is superadditive or piece-wise linear, we
have
{ f (k0i , k[i]) ≤ sa(k0i , k[i]) for all K } ⇒ {can(k0i , k[i]) ≤ f (k0i , k[i]) for all K }.
Proof Step 1. can is superadditive and piece-wise linear
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In the sum (2) deﬁning can(k0i ; k[i]), each term min j∈P(i,π){ki j } is superadditive
in (k0i , k[i]). If the relative ordering of the n numbers (k0i , ki j , j ∈ N \ {i}) remains
ﬁxed, each term min j∈P(i,π){ki j } is positively linear in (k0i , k[i]).
Step 2. Assume f is superadditive and f ≤ sa , prove can ≤ f
Notation: we write γ t for the n-dimensional vector γ t = (1;
t−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,
n−t︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1).
Fix x ≥ 0 and consider the cost matrix K with ki j = k0i = x for all i, j . Feasibility
implies nx ≤ n f (xγ 1); moreover by assumption f (xγ 1) ≤ sa(xγ 1) = x . Thus
f (xγ 1) = x . Next ﬁx any t, 2 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, and consider the cost matrix
k0i = x for all i ; ki j = 0 if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ t ; ki j = x otherwise.
Observe that the canonical price is f (xγ 1) = x for agents t +1, . . . , n and f (xγ t )
for agents 1, . . . , t . Feasibility implies
t f (xγ t ) + (n − t)x ≥ (n − t + 1)x ⇒ f (xγ t ) ≥ x
t
Next we pick a n-dimensional vector of costs (a; b2, b3, .., bn), where a is the cost
to the source, and
b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bp ≤ a ≤ b(p+1) ≤ · · · ≤ bn (5)
We decompose the vector (a; b2, b3, .., bn) as follows
(a; b2, b3, .., bn) = b2γ 1 +
⎧⎨
⎩
p−1∑
t=2
(bt+1 − bt )γ t
⎫⎬
⎭+ (a − bp)γ p
+(0;
p−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, b(p+1) − a . . . , bn − a) (6)
By the argument above
f (b2γ 1) = b2; f ((bt+1 − bt )γ t )
≥ 1
t
(bt+1 − bt ) for 2 ≤ t ≤ p − 1; f ((a − bp)γ p) ≥ 1p (a − bp)
Now superadditivity and f ≥ 0 imply
f (a; b2, b3, .., bn) ≥ b2 + (b3 − b2)2 +
(b4 − b3)
3
+ · · · + (a − bp)
p
the desired conclusion, upon checking that the right-hand-side is precisely
can(a; b2, b3, .., bn).
Step 3. Assume f is piece-wise linear and f ≤ sa, prove can ≤ f
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Both sides of the desired inequality are piece-wise linear in (k0i , k[i]) and sym-
metric in k[i]. Thus it is enough to prove can(a; b2, b3, .., bn) ≤ f (a; b2, b3, .., bn)
when (a; b2, b3, .., bn) is in one of the cones C p deﬁned by (5 ) for 2 ≤ p ≤ n, or
in C1 deﬁned by a ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bn . Fix p, 2 ≤ p ≤ n. By assumption, in C p the
function f takes the form
f (a; b) = λ1a +
n∑
s=2
λsbs
for some ﬁxed numbers λs (depending on p).
We use the notation γ t in step 1, as well as δt = (0;
t−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,
n−t︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1). Note that
γ t ∈ C p iff t ≤ p, while δt ∈ C p iff t ≥ p.
From the stand alone upper bound at δt for t ≥ p, we get ∑ns=t+1 λs ≤ 0. Our
assumption that f is non negative then implies λs = 0 for s ≥ p + 1.6
Next we consider the cost matrix ki j = k0i = 1 for all i, j : feasibility and f ≤ sa
imply f (γ 1) = 1 ⇔ ∑ps=1 λs = 1.
Finally, we ﬁx t ≤ p and consider the cost matrix K t
k0i = 1 for all i ; ki j = 0 if i, j ≤ t , ki j = 1 otherwise
⇒ (k0i , k[i]) = γ t if i ≤ t; (k0i , k[i]) = γ 1 if i ≥ t + 1
Here feasibility gives
v(N , K t ) = n − t + 1 ≤ t f (γ t ) + (n − t) f (γ 1) = t
(
λ1 +
p∑
s=t+1
λs
)
+ (n − t)
⇔ f (γ t ) ≥ 1
t
= can(γ t ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ p
In C p, both f (a; b) and can(a; b) are linear combinations of (a; b2, . . . , bp) only
(recall λs = 0 for s ≥ p + 1), and each vector in the cone {b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bp ≤ a}
is a positive linear combination of the vectors γ t , 1 ≤ t ≤ p. Therefore the above
inequalities conclude the proof. 
unionsq
Example 3 Here is a three agent example of a superadditive and piece-wise linear
decentralized pricing rule not bounded below by the canonical rule. Let
f (a; b1, b2) = 13a + min{b1, b2}
6 Note that even absent the assumption f ≥ 0, these equalities follow the feasibility property (1).
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Check that inequality (1) holds:
f (a; b1, b2) + f (a′; b2, b3) + f (a′′; b1, b3) = a + 2b1 + b2
where a is the mean of a, a′, a′′, and b1, b2 are the two smallest values among
b1, b2, b3. This is clearly bounded below by v(N , K ). It is just as easy to check
that f is not bounded above by the Stand Alone rule, and that it is continuous and cost
monotonic. Finally, we have
f (4; 1, 5) = 7
3
< can(4; 1, 5) = 1
3
4 + 1
2
+ 1
6
4 = 5
2
.
7 A direct characterization
We report an additional characterization of the canonical pricing rule, based on the
following two axioms on pricing rules.
• Independence of Irrelevant Links: for any two agents i, j ∈ N and proﬁle of
costs (k0i , k[i])
{ki j ≥ k0i } ⇒ f (N , k0i , k[i]) = f (N \ { j}, k0i , k[i, N \ { j}]).
If ki j ≥ k0i , the i j link is not relevant for agent i when linking to any network. Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Links then stipulates that the irrelevant cost ki j has no impact
on the price charged to agent i .
Next we have a decentralized version of an axiom analyzed in Bergantinos and
Vidal-Puga (2007):
• Equal Share of Extra Costs: for any proﬁle of costs (k0i , k[i]), agent i and
number δ > 0
{ki j ≤ k0i for all j} ⇒ f (k0i + δ, k[i]) = f (k0i , k[i]) + δ
n
for all i.
This axiom applies only to proﬁles where all nodes j are relevant to i’s charge, because
it is cheaper to connect to any one of them than to the source. Then it requires to charge
to agent i a fair share of any additional cost of connecting to the source.
Theorem 2 The Canonical Pricing Rule is uniquely characterized by Independence
of Irrelevant Links, Equal Share of Extra Costs, and the stand alone upper bound:
f (k0i , k[i]) ≤ k0i .
Proof (Sketch) It is easy to check that the axioms are satisﬁed by can. We show that
they lead to a unique solution. By Independence of Irrelevant Links all agents with
higher link costs than i’s source cost can be disregarded. Next, among the remaining
agents, rank their link costs in increasing order and consider the highest cost k∗ below
k0i . By Equal Share of Extra Costs the difference k∗ − k0i is shared equally between
the remaining agents. Using Independence of Irrelevant Links the agent(s) with link
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cost k∗ can then be removed and Equal Share of Extra Costs can be used to share the
difference between k∗ and the second highest cost and so forth until only agent i is
left to be connected to the source. By feasibility and stand alone upper bound agent i
must then pay his source cost. Thus, the price is uniquely determined by the axioms.

unionsq
We note that in the special case of two-agent pricing problems the canonical pricing
rule is uniquely characterized by feasibility (1), Stand Alone upper bound and Equal
Share of Extra Costs. We omit the straightforward argument.
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